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POLITICAL EDUCATION IN THE POST-ISLAMIST ERA: COMPARING THE PKS PARTY IN INDONESIA WITH THE AKP PARTY IN TURKEY

**ZAENAL ABIDIN RAHAWARIN¹, SAIDIN ERNAS² and GEMA PUTRA
RUMALUTUR³**

^{1,2}State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) Ambon, Indonesia.

³College of Islamic Studies, Seram Timur, Indonesia.

Corresponding author: Email: ¹rahawarinza@gmail.com

Email : ²saidinernas@iainambon.ac.id ; ³staisseramtur@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The ideological dynamics of Islamic parties in contemporary politics are always interesting to observe. On being faced with the acute threat of “extinction,” many have adjusted their ideological stances to suit the social changes that have occurred in Islamic society. This paper aims to examine how the process of ideological transformation for Islamic political parties has taken place in this post-Islamist era and how it has affected the existence of Islamic parties like the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – PKS) in Indonesia and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) in Turkey. This article highlights three important points: First, although the PKS and AKP both originated from Islamist movements in their respective countries, the AKP was the first to present itself as a party with a post-Islamist ideological vision, giving it the opportunity to build its image as a modern Islamic party. Second, in the post-Islamist context, both the AKP and PKS leverage middle-class Muslims as their support base during general elections, although the AKP has been much more progressive in terms of gaining grassroots support from villages and various minority groups in Turkey. Third, the AKP’s charismatic leadership system, with President Erdogan being associated with an admired Islamic profile, has given the AKP a political advantage. This contrasts with the PKS, whose political leaders have been mired in corruption scandals, and this has diminished people’s trust in the party.

Keywords: Ideology, Post-Islamism, PKS, AKP, Comparative politics, Indonesia, Turkey

Introduction

In recent years, Islamic political parties have transformed significantly in a number of Muslim nations. Islamic political parties that were once conservative and exclusionary in their desire to establish an Islamic state under sharia law have now evolved into modern parties that are democratic and inclusive. This is indeed the situation with Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – PKS) and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP). Conservative forces initially drove these two Islamic political parties in their desire to build a state based on Islamic sharia principles, but they managed to alter their philosophical and political basis to meet the demands of modern democracy. Indeed, these reformed Islamic political parties have been successful in responding to the growing aspirations for democracy and modernity in Islamic countries (Bayat, 2013). Whether intentionally or unintentionally, they have been moving away from the Islamist paradigm toward a new pattern that Bayat describes as post-Islamism,

whereby Islamic political parties aim to incorporate religion into modern politics. This demonstrates that contrary to what some social scientists, such as Bell (2001) and Fukuyama (1992), anticipated, Islam as an ideology never dies.

Several researchers explored the phenomenon of political transition before Bayat (2007) presented his ideas about post-Islamism. In the Indonesian context, Bachtiar Effendi (2013) and Burhanudin Muhtadi (2012) have demonstrated the presence of two political Islamic schools of thought: First, there are Islamist groups that want Indonesia to become an Islamic state, and second, there are modern Islamic organizations that want a democratic Indonesia that adheres to the essential ideals of inclusive Islam. In Turkey, some researchers have also noticed that Islamic groups are divided between those who seek to establish sharia law and those who simply wish to protect the essential ideals of Islam (Yesilada and Rubin, 2011; Inan, 2018). Moreover, Islamic political parties in Indonesia and Turkey claim to have undergone significant transformations, with them shifting from a conservative-Islamist approach to a more modern-democratic one. Studies, however, have yet to focus on the sorts of changes that have happened and the implications for the future development of Islamic political parties in these two nations.

In Indonesia, when the authoritarian New Order regime was replaced by political liberalization in 1998, ideological political practices were deemed to be no more. This allowed Islamic-based political parties to emerge in Indonesia and participate in the 1999 general election (Romli, 2004). Some of these, like the PKS, did well in the elections, but they were few and far between. While the PKS enjoyed considerable support, it was doomed to remain a marginal player in Indonesian politics. In contrast, the dynamics of Turkish national politics since the Mustafa Kemal Atatürk era, in contrast to Indonesia's secular philosophy, actually resulted in Islamic political parties rising to power and gaining control.

The roles of the PKS and AKP in determining the dynamics of different Islamic political ideologies in Indonesia and Turkey could be used to comparatively understand the evolution of these contemporary Islamic political parties' ideologies, particularly how they transformed between the Islamist and post-Islamist era. For example, why have Islamic parties in Indonesia, such as the PKS, been unable to attract sufficient Muslim votes to gain power, despite Muslims making up the majority of Indonesia's population. Conversely, why was the AKP in Turkey able to acquire significant support from the Turkish people? Our study of Islamic political ideology is intended to support politicians in developing a more contextual ideological perspective that could contribute to developing and empowering Islamic society and the global community. Furthermore, such work is critical for ensuring that Islamic political philosophies do not fall into the traps of fundamentalism, extremism, and even terrorism, all of which currently present challenges for Islam.

Research Questions

To guide the research procedure, three research questions were developed as follows:

Literature Review

Theoretical Construction of Post-Islamism: A New Era for Islamic Political Ideology

Researchers have tried to develop theoretical frameworks to describe the current state of Islamic politics, which has been morphing from an ideology based on establishing an Islamic state to increasingly nuanced forms. One of Bayat's (2013) viewpoints on what he calls post-Islamism is particularly fascinating: While researching the numerous social movements in Iran and Egypt, Bayat came to a theoretical conclusion about Islamic politics, namely that in order to understand the crucial components of post-Islamism, we must first understand the general evolution of Islamic political ideology.

Currently, there are two basic schools of Islamic political philosophy, and both recognize the relevance of Islamic values in all aspects of life, but their interpretation and applicability to modern life differ greatly. The idea of a nation state runs contrary to the concept of the ummah (Islamic community), which has no political or regional boundaries. Acknowledging the principle of syura (consultation) differs from the idea of democracy in modern discourse (Efendi, 1996). According to Tibe (2012), Islamism represents the notion that Islam comprises a comprehensive and superior set of principles or teachings that can be employed to guide social order.

At the other end of the spectrum, some Muslims also argue that Islam does not specify a standard governance system that the ummah must follow. In the words of Imara (1997, p. 76-77), an Egyptian Muslim thinker, "Islam as a religion does not determine a certain system of government for Muslims." According to this school of thought, even the term for state (dawlah) cannot be found in the Qur'an. Although the Qur'an uses various terms that refer to, or at least seem to, political power and authority, these are only incidental with any implications for political theory. In addition, it is important to note that as Maarif (1983, p. 33) admits, the Qur'an contains "ethical values and teachings...regarding the social and political activities of mankind." These teachings include the principles of "justice, equality, fraternity, and freedom," so for those who advocate this opinion, as long as the state adheres such principles, it is in accordance with Islamic teachings. In other words, the establishment of an Islamic state in a formal and ideological sense is not so important, so long as the state embodies Islamic values.

In addition to these two seemingly contradictory categories, there are also theoretical categories that are symbiotic in nature. The proponents of this view put forward the idea that religion and the state are reciprocal in nature (Syamsuddin, 1993; Rahawarin, 2006). This means that religion needs the state, because it can develop alongside the state, while the state needs religion because it grants legitimacy and authority through ethical and moral guidance. Abdullah (2013) mentioned this symbiotic paradigm in terms of an intersectional model between religion and the state. In this context, religion manifest mainly in politics in the form of official recognition by the state for various religious institutions, as well as the adoption of religious values and norms in the system for developing public policy, such as legislation that incorporates aspects of religious law (e.g., sharia law) in national law.

We have recently seen how even some of the most radical Islamic political groups have transformed their ideologies to secure public support. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt sought to engage with the democratic political system by developing various progressive ideas, but it was eventually overthrown by the Egyptian military, who took advantage of suspicions of Islamism. Likewise, several other Islamic movements, such as the PAS in Malaysia or even Hezbollah in Lebanon, continue to receive strong support from the community. It therefore seems that the contemporary Islamist movement does not have a single face, as described by the theorists mentioned above. Islamism must be comprehensively understood by relating it to a number of new developments. Therefore, the notion of post-Islamism developed by Bayat (2013) in recent years may help to observe how the contemporary Islamic movements are developing today.

Bayat (2013) conducted lengthy research for Iran and Egypt from the 1970s to the late 2000s and argued that recent movements in Islamic political ideology have come to embrace the spirit of democracy and modernization. This post-Islamist phenomenon is seen as correcting the conceptual failures of the Islamist movement, and it is a conscious effort to build rational and strategic modalities that limit the role of Islamist conservatism and exclusivity in the social, political, and intellectual spheres. In Bayat's view, post-Islamism avoids aiming to formalize Islamic law and instead highlights the compatibility between Islam and universal democratic discourses while still maintaining an Islamic identity.

The key to Bayat's post-Islamism is synergizing Islam with democracy and modernization, which presents challenges for Muslims today. Indeed, Islam needs to be seen as an ethical framework that is compatible with contemporary political demands. Various forms of Islamic formalization only serve to limit the flexibility of Islamic parties in dealing with the various sociopolitical problems they face. As Bayat (2013, p. 12) explains, it is wrong and irrelevant to ask "whether Islam is compatible with democracy"—instead, they should ask how Muslims, especially Islamic political parties, can conduct this adaptation process, so the idea of democracy will accord with the reality of the contemporary ummah. The worldview held by Islamists does not necessarily need to be seen as opposing democracy, as some of their ideologists have claimed. However, such criticism has been based on efforts to tackle the socioeconomic and political discrepancies resulting from the capital expansion of Western countries since the imperialist era.

Although Bayat successfully identified various examples of post-Islamism in Egypt and Iran, the facts about post-Islamism that he put forward cannot be clearly identified in these countries. In other words, the post-Islamist political movements described by Bayat tend to have failed in both countries for various complex reasons. Islamic movements in Iran, for example, prefer "frontal attacks" on symbols of Islamic power interpreted by the state, while Egyptian Islamic movements use "reformist methods" or "positional wars," in the Gramscian discourse, with regards to the state (Bayat, 2007, p. 76). Consequently, these two countries do not properly represent the post-Islamism phenomenon in a way that is relevant to current developments.

The phenomenon of political Islam in Indonesia and Turkey in recent years may better reflect Bayat's explanation of post-Islamism. Specifically, the cases of the AKP in Turkey and the PKS in Indonesia can help clarify the idea of post-Islamism. Although the AKP still carries an element of Islamic political ideology, it does not aim to change Turkey's secular nature, such that the Turkish military, the traditional guardian of secular Kemalism, remains content. Likewise, Islamic political groups in Indonesia, exemplified by the PKS, continue to seek to acquire more power through the face of Islam. Therefore, in the theoretical framework of Post-Islamism, the Islamic political parties in Indonesia and Turkey may better represent what Bayat describes as the post-Islamism phenomenon than those found in Egypt and Iran. Indeed, this phenomenon seems to accurately describe the practice of Islamic party ideology in the modern era.

Methods

Design

This research was based on a case study design, and it applied a qualitative approach to analyze the data (Yin, 2009; Cresswell, 2014) and compare Islamic political views in Indonesia and Turkey. Particular emphasis was given to investigating why no Islamic party had managed to win a general election in Indonesia, even though the AKP has won many in Turkey. Secular doctrines were analyzed to identify factors that make such parties successful. This study examined the situations in Indonesia and Turkey in 2018 and 2019.

Participants

The participants for this study included ten people from the PKS and six from the AKP. They included the general head of the party, other party heads, general secretaries, and the heads of the general teams for PKS in Indonesia and AKP in Turkey.

Instrument

Data Collection

Questionnaire

Interview

Document Analysis

Data Analysis

This paper presents the results of case studies and library research conducted for 2018–2019 in Indonesia and Turkey. Through this method, we sought to read important publications about the development of Islamic politics in Indonesia and Turkey, especially those related to two very influential Islamic political parties that can be said to reflect the post-Islamist nature of Islamic parties in the world today, namely the PKS and AKP.

During data collection, we read a number of books and other literature about Islamic political ideology, Islamic political parties, and the development of the PKS and the AKP, and we also examined the results of elections in Indonesia and Turkey over the last two decades. The collected literature data were then analyzed through a comparative political approach, as proposed by Chilcote (2003), in order to understand how Islamic parties such as the PKS and AKP perceive Islam as a political ideology and apply it to political life in Indonesia and Turkey, respectively.

Results

As a background for understanding the comparison of the political ideologies and practices of the PKS and AKP within the post-Islamism framework, a general description of the genealogy of Islamic political ideology in Indonesia and Turkey is first given to illustrate how the PKS and AKP came into life as Islamic political parties and struggled in the political dynamics of Indonesia and Turkey, respectively. It is important to discuss this before progressing into further discussions, because the journeys of the PKS and AKP as Islamic political parties with an Islamist “DNA” are quite amazing.

Islamic Political Ideology in Indonesia and the Birth of the PKS

The Islamic political movement in Indonesia actually started in the colonial era, particularly in the early 19th century as a form of resistance to Dutch colonialism. At the time, initial political movements like Sarikat Islam (1906), and then Muhammadiyah (1912) and Nadhatul Ulama (NU) (1926), used Islam within their resistance ideology, and this made a major contribution to achieving Indonesian independence. According to Maarif (1983), there was intense debate about the form of any state that would be created following independence, such as whether it should be an Islamic or nationalist state. The founding fathers from various political streams agreed to establish Indonesia as a republic that was not based on religion but which adopted Islamic values and teachings. Following Indonesia’s independence in 1945 and the start of the multi-party era, Islamic activists who continued to hold onto the Islamic political ideology founded the Masyumi Islamic Party, which managed to come second after the Indonesian National Party in the first general election in 1955. However, Masyumi subsequently broke up when the NU faction, which was more traditionalist, left to form the NU Islamic Party. Later on, in the era of the Suharto regime, this party was in power for 31 years (1967–1998). There was then a process of de-ideologicalization and simplification of the political parties, and Islamic political ideology was only represented by the United Development Party (PPP), whose existence was controlled by the Suharto regime, which later collapsed with the emergence of the reform movement in 1998.

Political reform in Indonesia then gave rise to a multi-party system, which in turn gave birth to a number of parties that adopted the Islamic political ideology, one of which was the PKS, which was initially called the Justice Party. The emergence of the PKS in Indonesia, according to Rahmat (2008), began with the activities of the tarbiyah movement from 1980. This movement had been initiated by Ustadz Hilmi Aminuddin, Salim Segaf Al Jufri, Encep Abdusyakur, and Abdullah Baharmus, who were graduates of universities in the

Middle East. This group, as noted by Abdurrahman (2013), were engaged in developing cadres through halaqah and usrah, which adopted the development model of Muslim Brotherhood (IM), as initiated by Hasan Al Banna in Egypt. In the midst of the very repressive social and political conditions of the New Order era at the time, tarbiyah activities became a forum for education and character building for young cadres from schools and universities. Fealy and Bubablo (2005) stated that many young Muslims were interested in the IM's model, which offered a new approach for Islamic da'wah activities. They therefore adopted the IM model by forming small groups or cells known as halaqah and usrah as the smallest unit, with these emphasizing adherence to ritual obligations, mutual assistance, assessment of Islamic knowledge, and social activities to help people in need. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the tarbiyah movement still presented itself as a religious movement and spread to all major campuses in Indonesia, such as the University of Indonesia, Bogor Agricultural University, the Bandung Institute of Technology, the Surabaya Tenth of November Institute of Technology, and several others (Abdurrahman, 2013).

The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 paved the way for the tarbiyah movement to transform from a social movement to a political one. After some deliberation, the core cadres of the tarbiyah movement agreed to form a political party (Soekanto, 2013). Thus, the Justice Party (PK) was founded on August 9, 1998 at the Al Azhar Mosque in Jakarta. This party positioned Islam at its core and adopted the Kaaba with two crescents between the vertical lines as its symbol. The PK's management consisted of core cadres who had been fostering tarbiyah activities on campuses. The PK participated in the first general election of the Reform Era in 1999, and although its vote share was smaller than that of some other parties (PDI-P, Golkar, PKB, PPP, PAN, and PBB), it secured seven seats in the House of Representatives.

Consolidation of Islamic Political Ideology in Turkey and the Emergence of the AKP

Similar to how the PKS emerged and developed in Indonesia, the history of the AKP in Turkey is a long one. This party's first general election victory in 2002 did not come out of nowhere—it was a continuation of an Islamist movement that had been initiated by Islamic-leaning parties with roots in the Milli Görüş socio-religious movement. The situation before the advent of Milli Görüş and the subsequent Islamic-leaning political parties was not very conducive to any particular Islamic movement (Kumbaracıbası, 2009). Indeed, the Republic of Turkey, which has had a secular constitution since its establishment in 1923, considered religion and its symbols to be a threat to the country's constitution. The founder and leader of the Al Nur Islamic movement, Said Nursi, was repeatedly imprisoned and exiled due to the Turkish government's repressive attitude toward Islamic movements, because it considered them as working against the secular constitution (Mardin, 1989).

Ironically, Islam's revival in Turkey was made possible largely because of the military reducing its repression of Islam in the 1980s, by which point the radical left had gained a strong following in Turkey. Indeed, the conflict between the radical left and right caused a tremendous commotion, with students and workers staging marches, strikes, and massive street protests. This led to violent clashes between left and right factions on campuses and

city streets, resulting in injury and death for some. This continued until the military launched its third coup in 1980 and imprisoned thousands of militants to restore security. As a tool to fight radical groups, the military leadership began to turn to Islam. The ban on Islamic education in schools was abolished in the hope that this would prevent students from being easily recruited by secular extremists. Thus, after being marginalized for so long, Islamic groups associated with the Nurcu movement (followers of the Turkish cleric Said Nursi) and the Sufi movement began to re-emerge (Kuru and Stepan, 2012).

The emergence of the Islamic spirit was also supported by Muslim figures who had studied in Western European countries like Germany and France, and when they returned to Turkey, they had come to embrace democratization along with the spirit of Islam. A prominent example was Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of the modern Milli Görüş Islamic movement mentioned above. Maranci (2010) stated that Erbakan's Islamist ideology was clearly reflected in the manifesto *Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (IGMG)*, which he published in 1969 while still studying in Germany. This later inspired the name of the organization he founded.

The emergence of the Milli Görüş movement coincided with Turkey's economic crisis, which peaked in 2001. The people and the private sector wanted change because they had lost their trust in the government. According to Aybey (2004), enough momentum had gathered for the re-emergence of Islamic-leaning parties when Turkey applied to become a member of the European Union, so the need for democratization strengthened, indirectly weakening the military's repressive attitude toward Islam and granting freedom to Islamic-leaning parties.

After a referendum to lift the ban on Islamic parties in 1987, Erbakan re-established an Islamic political party called the Welfare Party (Turkish: Refah Partisi). The ideology of this party was Islamist MiliGörüş and based on Islamist groups led by Ali Türkmen, Ahmet Tekdal, and Necmettin Erbakan. The Welfare Party stood in the 1991 elections and later formed a coalition with The Nationalist Labor Party (Turkish: MilliyetçiÇalışma Partisi – MCP) and the Reformist Democracy Party (Turkish: İslahatçıDemokrasi Partisi – IDP) (Soekanto, 2013). The party benefited from a pronounced rivalry between the two leaders of two different secular conservative parties, namely Mesut Yılmaz and TansuÇiller. This enabled Erbakan's party to enjoy surprising success in the 1995 elections, with them becoming the largest party and winning the general election. Erbakan became prime minister in 1996, a first for an Islamic group. However, Erbakan's image deteriorated after various accusations were leveled against him. The coalition government led by Erbakan was forced by the Turkish military to step down in 1997 over allegations that it had an Islamic agenda. Erbakan's Welfare Party was also suspended by the Constitutional Court because it was deemed to be promoting fundamentalist Islam in Turkey, and Erbakan himself was again banned from political activities by the Turkish Supreme Court because his views were deemed to be contrary to the principles of secularism embodied in Turkey's constitution (Soekanto, 2013).

Even though the Welfare Party was suspended and Erbakan banned from politics for two years, he remained a prominent political figure and a mentor for his cadres. Shortly after his

party's suspension in 1997, a small group of Islamic politicians formed a party called the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), and this became a new forum for former members of the Welfare Party. In the 1999 Elections, it won 111 seats, but this party was also dissolved (Soekanto, 2013). After this Erbakan founded Saadet Partisi, which had the same strategy as the previous Islamic parties.

² The dynamics in the rise and fall of Islamic political parties in Turkey since the MNP, the MSP, and Refah Partisi resulted in students and young people becoming leaders of Fazilet Partisi. After this, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan founded the AKP in 2001 as an Islamic political party that was more moderate, open, willing to compromise with the secular and military factions, and ready to resubmit Turkey's official application for EU accession. The AKP managed to gain significant votes in its first election in 2002, resulting in Abdul Gul becoming President of Turkey and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan becoming Prime Minister. Although the AKP did not identify itself as an Islamic party, it became a rallying point for Turkish Islamic activists. Erdoğan and the AKP grew stronger and attracted the attention of the Turkish people through various economic-development programs that they introduced in Turkey, which led to astonishing and unprecedented economic growth. Since then, the AKP and Erdogan have gone unchallenged, winning all Turkey's elections, including the most recent election of 2018.

The electoral achievements of the PKS and AKP in Indonesia and Turkey

Since its establishment on April 20, 1998, the PKS has participated in five general elections and continued to survive as a mid-level political party. The PKS, however, continues to experience challenges to increasing its vote share in elections. Since its first election in 1999 to the most-recent election in 2019, the PKS has come behind parties with more nationalist ideologies, such as the PDIP, the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), the Golkar Party, the Democratic Party, and the National Awakening Party. Despite claiming to be a grassroots party, in recent years, the PKS has had difficulty encouraging its members to engage in political elections at the local level. In some areas, the PKS has actually had to support other parties' candidates just to be involved in the election of regional heads. In some cases, the PKS has even had a number of regional candidates involved in corruption.

As the data from the General Elections Commission (KPU) show, in the first post-reform elections in 1999, the PKS, which at that time was called the PK, only received 1.36% of votes (1,436,565), so it did not pass the electoral threshold. In the subsequent election in 2004, the PKS managed to significantly increase its vote share to 7.34%. The ability of PKS activists to campaign for anti-corruption and a clean government increased the party's electability in the eyes of Indonesian voters. In the 2009 elections, the PKS managed to further increase its vote share to 7.88% (8,325,020 votes). Several leading PKS members now held key positions in ministries and state institutions. In the 2014 election, the PKS managed to maintain its number of votes at 8,480,204, but its vote share fell to 6.79%. In the most-recent 2019 election, the PKS managed to increase its vote share again to 8.21% (11,493,663 votes). Over the last decade, the PKS has consistently chosen to remain in opposition, with it being critical of President Joko Widodo's policies.

In Turkey, meanwhile, the AKP continued to achieve good results in every election, and rivals have struggled to match it until the most recent elections in 2018. In its first election in 2002, the AKP received 10,848,704 votes. This number increased in 2004 to 13,447,287 votes, making the party the winner. In the 2007 general election, the AKP again increased its votes to 16,327,291 votes, although this dipped slightly in 2009 to 15,353,553 votes. In 2011, the AKP received a very significant share of the vote with 21,346,876 votes, which it largely maintained in 2014 with 20,519,134 votes. Meanwhile, the party received 23,669,933 votes in early November 2018, and Erdogan himself became the legitimate president of Turkey with 52.65% of the vote.

Discussion

The presence of the PKS and AKP, together with their efforts to transform their ideologies and policies over the last two decades in Indonesia and Turkey, respectively, illustrates how parties can develop an Islamic political ideology that appeals to voters. Nevertheless, various internal and external factors have affected these processes, so the dynamics differ for the PKS in Indonesia and the AKP in Turkey. We analyze below the efforts of the PKS and the AKP to articulate Islamic political ideology in the context of Indonesia and Turkey and investigate why they have had such stark differences in electoral success in their respective countries.

Changes in the PKS and AKP as a Post-Islamist Phenomenon

The PKS's ideological transition from an Islamist to a post-Islamist stance can be seen from several aspects. The first aspect relates to how the party limited its electability through the exclusivity of its membership, leading to it opening up its membership to non-Muslims in 2004. Following this, the membership of the PKS in several areas where Muslims are in the minority—such as in Papua, Maluku, and East Nusa Tenggara—has increased significantly (Soekanto, 2013). This is especially true for several areas in the western part of Southeast Maluku.

Thus, it appears that in addition to attracting new members to play an active role in a party, a post-Islamist ideology is also reflected in the behavior of its open and inclusive membership, with it being more accommodating of other beliefs, as shown in the cases of Papua and Maluku. However, the PKS has not articulated its post-Islamist ideology from the perspective of the wider community's interests, where it still needs to be proven. Indeed, it needs to further manifest in universal programs that benefit all people, such as those aimed at justice and welfare.

The AKP in Turkey is recognized as having influenced other Islamic movements around the world in the post-Islamist context. According to Fealy and Bubalo (2005), the AKP has the identity of a moderate and open Islamic political party. Indeed, the AKP is considered to have been successful at integrating Islam with modernism and democracy (Dzakirin, 2009). However, some Western observers still classify the AKP as an Islamic party because all its leaders practice an Islamic way of life, such as avoiding alcohol, wearing the hijab, and so on. An advantage of the AKP lies in its efforts to improve the wealth and wellbeing of the Turkish people. At present, when looking at the AKP's public statements, constituents,

programs, attitudes, and activities after being the governing party in Turkey for more than a decade, the AKP is no longer categorized as an Islamist party but rather as a conservative party, which in Turkish political tradition can be thought of as center-right. Thus, in the framework of Bayat (2013), we can confidently state that the AKP is a good example of an Islamist party that has transformed itself into a post-Islamist one.

The PKS in Indonesia, however, has fared somewhat differently. Indeed, when the AKP in Turkey transformed into a post-Islamist political party in 2001, the PKS still appeared to be an Islamist party. It only seriously became a post-Islamist party in 2008, by which point the AKP had been in power for six years having won two successive elections. Thus, the AKP's transition to becoming a post-Islamist party has been much faster and more consistent than that of the PKS. When a young AKP member, namely Erdoğan at the age of 40, was Mayor of Istanbul (2004–2008), he managed to solve most of the city's chronic problems, such as its water supply, air pollution, traffic congestion, and waste management, as well as improving the city's infrastructure to improve the mobility of its residents. Similarly, PKS member Nur Mahmudi Ismail, the former president of PK, became Mayor of Depok at the age of 45 in 2005. However, unlike Erdoğan, Nur Mahmudi, like several other prominent PKS leaders, focused more on aspects of morality. Indeed, he seemed more concerned with less important issues, such as a slogan for eating with the right hand or requiring the city officials to be able to recite the Qur'an. Meanwhile, problems with poor city infrastructure, waste management, and traffic congestion were never resolved. In addition, eradicating corruption, developing the economy, and ensuring people's welfare were still far removed from the people's expectations. The Kompas national daily newspaper even reported in 2008 that Nur Mahmudi himself had been named as a corruption suspect by the KPK for misappropriating funds from infrastructure-development projects in Depok City.

In fact, it is not just the PKS that has experienced turmoil in the shift from an Islamist party to a post-Islamist one, because the AKP also experienced difficulty when it split into two different political parties, namely the AKP and Saadet Partisi. Erbakan and Saadet Partisi accused the AKP of deviating from Islam, but on the other hand, they themselves were constantly accused of being anti-secularist Islamists, leading to an attempted coup in 2007. However, the leaders and members of the AKP had strong characters and were able to continue to successfully communicate with the Turkish people.

Therefore, while the PKS was still busy with working out how to apply Islamic ideology, the ideological differences in the AKP had been resolved since they had distanced themselves from their friends in the Virtue Party, enabling them to start winning elections. Even though figures in the Saadet Partisi claimed that the AKP had abandoned Islamic ideology, the AKP is actually an Islamic party in that it reflects universal values and works to improve the wealth and welfare of the people.

Comparison of the Muslim Support Bases for the PKS and AKP

According to Nasr (2009), ideological transformation can also be reflected in the supporters of political parties. The PKS's supporters are mainly limited to the urban middle class, and there are few from traditional or secular Muslim backgrounds and even fewer from Christian minorities. This limitation has meant that the PKS's votes are mostly concentrated in the big cities of Java, where a parliamentary seat is hard to win because results are calculated based on the proportion of Indonesia's population.

While the AKP in Turkey originated from the Milli Görüş movement and previous Islamic parties (MSP, Refah Partisi, and Fazilet Partisi), the PKS is a political party that was founded by the educated middle class. The PKS supporters are therefore mainly from the middle class, which has grown as the economy and education has improved since the 1970s. In contrast, the AKP has expanded its support base from Istanbul, where its main supporters are, to include urban and rural working classes and the secular Muslim enclaves of Izmir and Ankara. This has meant that in all the 81 provinces of Turkey, the AKP received broad support, allowing it to win the 2002 general election.

Furthermore, the successes of the AKP government's actions from 2002 to 2018 also contributed to the party's electoral victories, with it winning over support from secular Muslims who previously supported the CHP and MHP, as well as voters from the Christian and Jewish minorities. According to Hwang (2000), the AKP has managed to embrace all areas of society, whether they be male or female, rich or poor, highly or lowly educated, religious or secular. The AKP is even supported by Christians and Jews, which represent only 1% of Turkey's population, because they consider the AKP and Erdoğan to be inclusive and non-discriminatory and capable of achieving political stability and economic improvement.

Thus, if the PKS wants to do better in Indonesia's elections, it must follow in the footsteps of the AKP and expand its loyal support base. There is no need to restrict such efforts out of concerns about not being able to foster them within the party's ideological cadre system. The PKS simply needs to follow the example of the AKP in embracing all segments of society. The educated urban middle class that mainly support the PKS represent a good starting point, but such people tend to be very rational in their voting behaviors, so it may be harder to ensure their loyalty. A grassroots base, however, can be more loyal due to sociological reasons, such as a feeling of kinship or friendship, or the influence of certain charismatic figures. The PKS also needs to recruit more supporters in rural communities.

Comparison of the Leadership Profiles of the AKP and PKS

Another interesting point to explore is how the leadership profiles of the AKP and PKS have developed in the parties. Weber (1968) suggested that a charismatic leadership was important for mobilizing the political support of traditional societies. The PKS did have a charismatic figure in the form of Hilmi Aminuddin, the founder of the Tarbiyah movement that gave birth to the PK party, but he was not popular with the Indonesian people, and he preferred to act as more of a kingmaker behind the scenes. Since the 1999 elections, young figures have come to light, such as Hidayat Nurwahid (38 years old), chairman of the MPP; Nur Mahmudi Ismail (38 years), president of PK; and Anis Matta (30 years old). None of these three PKS figures

were well known to the public, so the PKS gained the reputation of being a party of educated young people.

The PKS policy of emphasizing collective leadership benefits the PKS internally because every member has the opportunity to become a leader. However, in the dynamics of communal Indonesian politics, leadership is an important aspect for winning elections, and this is an area where the PKS is lacking, because Indonesian people inevitably consider the leaders when choosing a party to vote for (Tribun News, 2018).

In contrast, the AKP's Erdoğan became a very popular figure in Turkey (Beaumont, 2011). In many places and on various occasions, Erdoğan's photo is placed alongside that of Mustafa Kemal, the founding father of the Republic of Turkey, thus portraying them as equals. Whenever Erdoğan appears before the Turkish people, they often shout his full name, "Recep Tayyip Erdoğan," or "TurkiyeSeninleGururDuyuyor" (Turkey is proud of you). Various parties also describe him as the Salahuddin Al Ayyubi of the 21st century because of his firm stance on Israel (Lubis, 2017). Aspects of Erdoğan's leadership represent all the types of leadership authority mentioned by Weber (1968), namely a charismatic leadership that is accepted by society in addition to having a legal mandate. All the informants interviewed in this study positioned Erdoğan as one of the main determinants of the AKP's success as a post-Islamist party. His strong, decisive personality, willingness to defend Turkey, and strong desire to enrich the Turkish people has made him well known beyond Turkey in neighboring regions and the wider world. Indeed, his leadership has been a dominant influence in the AKP's electoral victories.

Learning from the Achievements of the PKS and AKP in General Elections

The ideologies of the PKS and AKP inevitably contributed to their electoral results in general elections in Indonesia and Turkey. The two parties were able to develop post-Islamist ideologies and manifest them in practical political policies. The PKS, however, continues to experience difficulties in increasing its vote share in elections, such that it has only performed moderately well behind other political parties that carry nationalist ideologies. Despite claiming to be a grassroots party, the PKS has in recent years experienced difficulties in getting its members to stand in local elections. In some areas, it has actually had to support nationalist party candidates in order to be involved in regional elections.

This presents a difficult internal challenge that is difficult to overcome for several reasons. First, it appears the PKS is missing out on political innovations that its members often successfully showed in the past. For example, in the Indonesian legislative body (the DPR RI), the PKS representatives used to be quite vocal, and they were respected and sought after by many journalists as initiators of important policies. These days, they often initiate policies that generate antipathy among the public. For example, they have pushed for the right to question the KPK, and this has been considered an attack on the fight against corruption in Indonesia. Second, it seems that the PKS does not have a long-term strategy for maintaining its votes in a number of provinces, because it began to lose a number of seats in several regions that had been its political base in the 2009 elections. Third, the PKS lost political

momentum in not proposing candidates for the regional election rounds from 2015 to 2018, especially in regions where it had a large number of supporters. In the previous regional election rounds, PKS candidates were almost always regarded as serious contenders by other parties and coalitions, especially in areas like North Sumatra, Banten, and Jakarta (Tribun News, 2016).

Fourth, the PKS lost its reputation as an honest, trusted Islamic party, which had served as an attraction in general elections. This has become evident in the last three years, with no strong agenda having been successfully expressed by the PKS. In the three previous elections, a policy-based agenda in areas like anti-corruption and clean governance had managed to appeal to voters, but no such agendas arise from the PKS now. Ahead of the 2019 election, the PKS used the slogan of #2019ChangeThePresident, but the only one who benefited from this hashtag was presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto of the Gerindra nationalist party. The PKS is considered to have failed in manifesting the coattail effect that is usually enjoyed by parties with popular leaders. This happens because figures like Prabowo are difficult to associate with the character of the PKS as a post-Islamist party.

In contrast, the AKP in Turkey has continued to achieve excellent results in every election, and the AKP's votes have been difficult for rival parties to match until the latest elections in 2018. The AKP's success can therefore be viewed from various interesting perspectives. First, the AKP's continued success is seen as evidence of the Turkish public's distrust of the opposition parties, namely the Republican People's Party (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish: Milliyet Hareket Partisi – MHP). The CHP ruled Turkey before the AKP for almost 80 years and has secular ideological ties to the Turkish military. However, during the CHP's long rule of Turkey, it made no remarkable political, economic, or social progress.

Second, the AKP's policies during its stay in power in Turkey are considered to favor the welfare of the Turkish people. Over more than a decade of leading Turkey, these changes have been appreciated by society. It was different to when the CHP was in power, when the per capita income was only US\$3,000, because since the AKP rose to power in 2002, this has increased rapidly to US\$11,000. Turkey's economic growth also averages over 6% per year. The AKP's victory in every election sends the clear message that Turkish voters want the economic and political stability that the AKP has so far brought.

Third, the image of Islamic culture is attached to the AKP, and despite Turkey adhering to a secular ideology, 99% of the population is Muslim. Turkish society therefore longs for the Islamic culture that has been inherent in the country for centuries, such as when the Seljuk kingdom and the Ottoman Empire ruled the Anatolian peninsula. This was evident in the referendum on constitutional change, with 58% of the Turkish people wanting change. Likewise, the government lifted the ban on wearing headscarves in public places, and now we often find Turkish women confidently wearing headscarves in public places, even in government offices. Although the military and supporters of Turkish secularism continue to shun the Islamic populism offered by the AKP, it has been embraced by the wider

community, many of who consider Islam part of their identity. Even an attempted coup by the military in 2016 against President Erdogan's government was unable to overthrow the AKP.

Conclusion

This paper shows that Islamic political ideology never truly dies but rather adapts to the political dynamics. This is clearly evidenced by the PKS in Indonesia and the AKP in Turkey, which have succeeded by meeting modern democratic expectations while still displaying an Islamic ideology, even if it is more moderate than the Islamism they once embraced. This reflects the phenomenon of post-Islamism described by Asef Bayat.

This paper highlights the fact that although the PKS and the AKP both came from Islamist movements, the AKP was the first to consistently present itself as a party with a post-Islamist ideological vision. This gave the AKP the opportunity to start building a modern Islamic party that did not conflict with the democratic political system. Under the leadership of the AKP, Turkey remains a secular state, but it also pays close attention to the Islamic spirituality that is increasingly gaining popularity in Turkish society. In contrast, the PKS only started to develop post-Islamist views relatively recently, and it has done so in an unconvincing way because many people still suspect the PKS of having a hidden agenda to promote Islamism if it rises to power. In the post-Islamist context, the AKP and the PKS both rely on the Muslim middle class for support in elections, but the AKP has been more progressive in terms of gaining support at the grassroots level, while the PKS has failed to appeal to villagers and working-class people.

The AKP's charismatic leadership system with the strong Islamic spirituality that is attached to President Erdogan is another reason for the party's popular support. During Erdogan's leadership, the Turkish economy has grown rapidly with the government functioning very well, especially in the last few years, with corruption having been largely eliminated and infrastructure continuing to be developed. This contrasts with the PKS, whose political leaders have been mired in corruption scandals, thus causing people to lose trust in the party. Indeed, this has undermined the Islamic moral values that the PKS has been striving for.

While this paper notes that these two parties have attempted to follow an ideological transformation in a post-Islamist direction, other factors such as leadership, exemplariness, a wide support base, and policies to improve people's quality of life have served as differentiating factors that likely determined the differing courses of the PKS and AKP in elections, and these have yet to be comprehensively studied.

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